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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIV
By the decision in the principal case, it is evident that it
is up to the legislature to state clearly the test to be applied
by the trier of fact when deciding whether the defendant
is competent to stand trial. Such a test should reflect the
reasons for determining the defendant's competency at this
stage in the proceedings.
J. B. POWELL, JR.
The Immunity Doctrine Under Attack
Wangler v. Harvey1
Defendant, a New York resident, was devisee of prop-
erty located in New Jersey, and also was named executor
of the estate in the will. Plaintiff, a New Jersey real estate
broker who wished to sell the property, alleged that she
was injured while being escorted by the defendant through
the devised premises.
A suit based on these facts was instituted by plaintiff in
New Jersey against defendant in his capacity as executor
of the estate. Since defendant was a nonresident, this suit
was instituted by serving process upon the surrogate pur-
suant to the power of attorney required to be filed with the
surrogate.2 During the course of the trial, defendant was
served with summons and complaint which named him as
defendant in his individual capacity, as beneficiary under
the will.
Defendant moved to quash the service of the summons,
arguing that as a nonresident of New Jersey in the state
solely for the purpose of attending court proceedings he
was immune from service. The Superior Court's granting
of this motion was reversed on appeal.
The appellate court rejected the doctrine of immunity
for nonresident plaintiffs and defendants, stating that it
Rrv. 293 (1962), which discusses the procedure in Maryland for determin-
ing whether a prisoner, exonerated from punishment because insane at
time of commission of the act, will go free or be detained in a mental
hospital; Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Delen-
dant, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 832 (1960), which deals with the Federal Pre-
Trial Commitment Statute and suggests that the procedure be amended to
provide that if the court is of the bpinion that the defendant is incom-
petent, a ruling to this effect should be deferred if counsel raises a matter
for pre-trial determination or counsel alleges a good-faith defense on the
merits and chooses to go to trial on the merits, notwithstanding defen-
dant's incompetency; and Hazard & Louisell, Death, The State, and the
Insane: Stay of Ex'ecution, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 381 (1962), which explores
the rationale behind not punishing a prisoner who is presently insane.
1 41 N.J. 277, 196 A. 2d 513 (1968).
2 N.J.S.A. 3A: 12-14 (1953).
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"'moves in a direction wholly inconsistent with today's con-
cept of justice."3 In a concurring opinion, one justice felt
it was unnecessary to reconsider the doctrine of immunity
which has long been the law of New Jersey, since the claims
in the two cases arose out of the same transaction, and an
exception to the general immunity rule could be applied.4
Under the early common law, the courts attempted to
prevent interference with the administration of justice
by exempting from arrest litigants who were under civil or
criminal process.5 Designed to prevent interruptions and
delays which could be caused if necessary participants had
to defend other actions,6 the privilege of declaring immun-
ity was considered that of the court rather than that of the
individual. The immunity developed to include all forms
of civil process.7 Although initially conferred upon all per-
sons attending judicial proceedings, immunity was later
limited to nonresidents."
Under the prevailing view today, a nonresident witness,
plaintiff, or defendant is not subject to service of process
while in a foreign forum for purposes of testifying, prose-
cuting, or defending in any civil cause of action which
existed prior to his entrance into the jurisdiction.' The
argument is advanced that unless the nonresident is granted
immunity he will stay away, and injustice might result
from his absence. As a corollary to this argument, it is
contended that no one is hurt by the exemption, because, if
8 196 A. 2d at 517. The court relied on the position of the Rhode Island
court, Baldwin v. Emerson, 16 R.I. 304, 15 Atl. 83 (1888) ; and the recent
New Jersey decisions of Grober v. Kahn, 76 N.J. Super. 252, 184 A. 2d 161
(1962), in which the court held that a nonresident in the state for the pur-
pose of obtaining a deposition was not immune from service of process; and
KXorff v. G. & G. Corp., 21 N.J. 558, 122 A. 2d 889 (1956), in which the
doctrine of immunity was held not to apply to a nonresident plaintiff
endeavoring to avoid a counterclaim in his action.
'196 A. 2d at 519.5 E.g., Walpole v. Alexander, 99 Eng. Rep. 530 (1782) ; 3 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 282 (Lewis ed. 1902).
1 See Whited v. Philips, 98 W. Va. 204, 126 S.E. 916 (1925), for a dis-
cussion of the history of the immunity doctrine. Today there appears to
be a split of authority as to whether the privilege of immunity is that of
the court or of the individual. See Annot. 85 A.L.R. 1340 (1933). The
Supreme Court, Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222 (1932), and Maryland,
Feuster v. Redshaw, 157 Md. 302, 145 Atl. 560 (1929), adhere to the tradi-
tional view.
" Hale v. Wharton, 73 Fed. 739 (C.C. W.D. Mo. 1896).
8Compare Walpole v. Alexander, 99 Eng. Rep. 530 (1782) with Hatch
v. Blissett, 93 Eng. Rep. 338 (1714).
9 See, e.g., Stewart v. Ramsey, 242 U.S. 128 (1916) ; Marges v. Morondas,
183 Md. 362, 40 A. 2d 816 (1945) ; Murrey v. Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 16 P.
2d 741 (1932) ; Diamond v. Earle, 217 Mass. 499, 105 N.E. 363 (1914);
Halsey v. Stewart, 4 N.J.L. 366 (Sup. Ct. 1817) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS
§ 15, comment b (1942) ; 18 MD. L. ENcyc. Process § 8 (1942) ; 42 AM. Jun.
Process § 139 (1942) ; and 72 C.J.S. Process § 80 (1951).
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it did not exist, the nonresident would not go into the for-
eign jurisdiction, and service of process could not be made
on him in any event. It is also argued that since courts
should be open and accessible to all who approach them, the
immunity is granted to encourage the attendance of nec-
essary participants.
In recent years the courts have begun to subject these
arguments to close scrutiny and as a result a tendency to
limit the immunity doctrine has developed. In Lamb v.
Schmitt, ° the Supreme Court emphatically enforced the
position that the doctrine was founded upon the conven-
ience of the court, not the convenience of the individual
and stated that immunity should not be granted if it "would
so obstruct judicial administration in the very cause for the
protection of which it is invoked as to justify withholding
it"" The Court then said that the privilege "should not be
enlarged beyond the reason upon which it is founded."' 2
Some of the arguments against immunity are strongly
stated by the New Jersey court in the instant case. First
it is argued that a nonresident plaintiff voluntarily invokes
the court's jurisdiction and there is no valid justification
for giving him immunity.
"In the case of the nonresident plaintiff, the induce-
ment to sue in a foreign jurisdiction is the hope of
obtaining judgment, not immunity. The forum is his
choice and it is his own interest which causes him to
come."
Secondly, as to the nonresident defendant,
"[H]e too is not motivated by altruism but rather by
the desire to defend the action. He has exercised a
choice. His appearance is governed by selfish -
although proper - considerations. He must decide
whether the pains of other litigation are more severe
than the rigors of a default judgment in the first suit."' 4
In addition, the court pointed out that the granting of an
exemption from process derogates from the right of a
10285 U.S. 222, 225 (1932). Schmitt paid funds to Lamb pending the
outcome of another suit and sought to recover part of the funds. Lamb,
a resident of Illinois, was served with process in the suit to recover part
of the funds while he was in the Northern District of Mississippi in attend-
ance as an attorney in the principal suit. Lamb claimed immunity from
service of process as a nonresident participant in a judicial proceeding.
However, the Supreme Court refused to grant the immunity, stating, that
"Judicial necessities require that such immunity be withheld." Id. at 228.
"Id. at 228.
12285 U.S. at 225.
18 196 A. 2d at 517.
14 Ibid.
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creditor to sue his debtor wherever he may be found15
and "shifts the burden of traveling to a foreign jurisdiction
from the nonresident to the resident party."'6
Since the two suits in Wangler seemingly arose out of
the same transaction, the court could have disposed of the
issue on the basis of this exception to the immunity doc-
trine. The court, however, was sufficiently aroused to re-
pudiate the immunity doctrine as far as nonresident plain-
tiffs and defendants were concerned. The question as to
nonresident witnesses was left open. The court stated that
it "will retain jurisdiction unless there is an affirmative
showing that it would violate traditional concepts of fair
play and substantial justice to subject defendant to its
jurisdiction."'1 7
The court also pointed out 8 that the application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens,19 which has been ac-
cepted in New Jersey,20 was the best manner in which to
dispose of the problem of immunity. If the nonresident can
show that there is a more convenient forum in which to
try the cause of action, the court can refuse to exercise itsjurisdiction over the matter, but the court emphasized2
that the refusal to exercise jurisdiction will be considered
an exception rather than the rule.
Most courts have not gone as far as New Jersey. But
while practically all grant immunity to the nonresident
witness,22 recent decisions indicate a trend toward a care-
ful scrutiny of the circumstances of each case where party
litigants are concerned, 23 especially where the causes of
action arise out of the same transaction.24 The courts have
15 Ibid.
1 0 Ibid. An argument might also be made that the rationale of accessi-
bility of the courts is self-defeating since by granting immunity to a non-
resident the courtroom doors are actually closed to anyone who might have
a valid cause of action against the nonresident unless he goes to the state
of the nonresident to try his cause of action.
"Id. at 518.
Is Ibid.
10 "The rule of forum non convenien8 is an equitable one embracing the
discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has
over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the action before it
may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere." Price v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 42 Cal. 2d 577, 268 P. 2d 457, 458 (1954). See also Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.MS. 501 (1947).
20 See e.g., Gore v. United States Steel Corp., 15 N.J. 301, 104 A. 2d 670(1954).
21 196 A. 2d 518.
2 For a collection of cases see 42 AM. JUR. Process § 139 (1942).
-8 See 36 TEMP. L.Q. 346 (1963).
2' See 84 A.L.R. 2d 421 (1962), where the suit for which process is served
in the foreign forum relates to the same subject matter as that of the non-
resident plain-tiff's claim, the balance of convenience would seem to be
1964]
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also tended to make a distinction between a voluntary and
compulsory entrance into the jurisdiction, granting im-
munity only for the latter.25
The Maryland Court of Appeals has been very liberal
in granting immunity to nonresident witnesses,26 plain-
tiffs,2" and defendants,2" and criminal defendants.29 The
Maryland position is clearly stated in Rule 104g of the
Maryland Rules of Procedure: "During such time as a non-
resident is in this State for the purpose of testifying as a
witness, or for prosecuting or defending an action, he shall
not be subject to service of process." 0
The most recent Maryland case involving the immunity
doctrine is J. & H. Stables, Inc. v. Robinson.31 Robinson, the
owner of a race horse which he had leased to the defend-
ant, a nonresident corporation, instituted replevin proceed-
ings against the horse's trainer in Maryland. Defendant
was granted permission to intervene. During the trial, de-
fendant was served in another action in which Robinson
sought cancellation of the lease. The trial court refused to
quash the service, but the Court of Appeals reversed, hold-
ing that defendant was immune and stating that "[Tihe
privilege of immunity is one which the courts deem vital
to the administration of justice and the tendency is to
extend rather than restrict it. '32
Only once has the Maryland Court of Appeals made an
exception to the immunity doctrine. In Mullen v. San-
sufficiently shifted to support a denial of immunity. See, e.g., Mullen v.
Sanborn, 79 Md. 364, 29 At. 522 (1894) ; and ,State ex rel. Ivery v. Circuit
Court, 51 So. 2d 792 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1951).
5 See, e.g., Mullen v. Sanborn, 79 Md. 364, 29 Atl. 522 (1894) ; Murrey v.
Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 16 P. 2d 741 (1932); and Netograph Mfg. O. v.
Scrugham, 197 N.Y. 377, 90 N.E. 962 (1910).2 0 Bolgiano v. Gilbert Lock Co., 73 Md. 132, 20 Atl. 788 (1890), noted in
113 A.L.R. 154 (1938).27 1lck v. Cockins, 131 Md. 625, 102 AU. 1022 (1911).
28 Long v. Hawken, 114 Md. 234, 79 AtI. 190 (1911).
29 Feuster v. Redshaw, 157 Md. 302, 306, 145 AtL 560, 562 (1929), noted in
65 A.L.R. 1370 (1930) and 20 A.L.R. 2d 178 (1951), in which the court said:
"The reason for the exemption is because it is grounded on public
policy and necessary for the due administration of Justice. The rule at
once tends to assure the attendance of nonresident witnesses and
suitors, and the free and complete presentation of the case in a trial
in which the witnesses and the parties will not be distracted, harassed,
or intimidated by the prospect of other litigation."
80 The Maryland cases have not relied upon 2 MD. CODE Art. 26, § 3 (1957),
which has been the law of Maryland since 1805. The statute provides that
"No person shall sue or be sued in privilege," and arguably should be
applicable law in the area of immunity. However, the cases seem to con-
strue the statute as referring to the privilege of jurymen and government
officers. See Peters v. League, 13 Md. 58 (1859). See also Brooks v. Chesley,
4 Har. & McH. 295 (1799).
21221 Md. 365, 157 A. 2d 451 (1959).
82 Id. at 368. The court relied upon Rule 104g.
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born33 defendant nonresident had an attachment on orig-
inal process issued against plaintiff in Baltimore. While
defendant was in Baltimore to testify, the attachment was
quashed, and plaintiff brought suit for malicious prosecu-
tion. In refusing to grant immunity to defendant the court
stated:
"Sound public policy... as well as the administration
of equal justice, would seem to demand that no induce-
ments should be held out to nonresident suitors to
avail themselves of the harshest remedy known to
our statutes; but if they should come, and should abuse
the remedy to the injury of an alleged debtor, let them
answer here as the residents of the State must do in
like cases. '3 4
Mullen presents a situation in which the application of
the immunity doctrine would have obstructed rather than
promoted the cause of justice. Yet in light of J. & H.
Stables and Rule 104g, it is doubtful whether the court, in
a similar case today, would be able to withhold immunity.
Although Rule 104g merely states the existing case law, 5
its incorporation3 1 into the Maryland Rules of Procedure
provides it with the force of legislative enactment, 7 at the
loss of the judicial flexibility required to properly adjudi-
cate a J. & H. Stables situation. It is suggested that thosejurisdictions, such as Maryland, which adhere strictly to
the immunity doctrine, might re-examine the rationale of
the doctrine and abstain from arbitrary application when
this rationale is non-existent or overridden by other valid
considerations.3 3 Then it could no longer be said that the
immunity cases are determined solely "by a sentimentality
singular in the law. '3 9
THOMAS C. HAYDEN, JR.
8879 Md. 364, 29 Atl. 522 (1894), noted in 84 A.L.R. 2d 441 (1962), 19
A.L.R. 829 (1922), and 25 L.R.A. 721 (1894).
8- 79 Md. 364, 368, 29 Atl. 522, 523 (1894).
"J. & H. Stables, Inc. v. Robinson, 221 Md. 365, 367, 157 A. 2d 451 (1959).
8' The rule took affect on Jan. 1, 1959.
3 2 MD. CODE Art. 26, § 25 (1957), empowers the Court of Appeals to
prescribe the rules for practice and procedure. The rules may be rescinded,
modified or added to only by the Court of Appeals or by the General
Assembly.
88 See Note, Immunity of Non-Re8ident Participants In a Judicial Pro-
ceeding From Service of Process - A Proposal for Renovation, 26 IND. L.J.
459 (1951-52).
89 Keefe and Roscia, Immunity and Sentimentality, 32 CORNEmL L.Q. 471,
489 (1947).
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